Challenge Filed to First DCA's Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction
Since 1979, the First District Court of Appeal in Tallahassee has had exclusive, statewide jurisdiction over all workers' compensation appeals. But that will change if a South Florida claimant has his way. On 6/15/2007, in Saldana v. Miami-Dade County, Florida (large file, be patient), the claimant filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the Florida Supreme Court in which he challenges the constitutionality of s.440.271, the statute which grants such exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Florida has five intermediate appellate courts which divide the state geographically. Most appeals from trial courts around the state are filed in the district court of appeal in the geographic area of the state where the trial court sits. But not workers' compensation appeals. As part of the 1979 overhaul of the Florida Workers' Compensation Act, the Florida Legislature enacted s.440.271, which says that all workers' compensation appeals must be filed in the First DCA in Tallahassee. Why was this done? Well, for one thing, the Legislature believed that it would be better for one court to develop special expertise in this area of the law. The intent also was to cut down on the number of workers' compensation appeals being filed in the Florida Supreme Court. By limiting appeals to one district court of appeal - thus eliminating the possibility of inter-district conflict - the Legislature accomplished this goal.
If you don't want to read the whole thing, here's my summary of Saldana's argument:
(1) Rollins v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 384 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1980), the case which previously upheld the constitutionality of s.440.271, is no longer authoritative. In that case the supreme court reasoned that the statute was constitutional because the Florida Division of Workers' Compensation was required to be a party in all workers' compensation appeals. Because the Division was part of a state agency based in Tallahassee (i.e., within the territorial jurisdiction of the First DCA), the First DCA had a sufficient "nexus" to the case. But the requirement that the Division be a party to workers' compensation appeals was repealed by the Legislature in 1990. See Ch. 90-201, s. 27, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 91-1, s. 25, Laws of Fla. Therefore, the First DCA "nexus" no longer exists.
(2) Workers' compensation claimants who live in Central and South Florida (i.e., outside the territorial jurisdiction of the First DCA) aren't ever allowed to vote on whether the judges of the First DCA should be retained in office. This effectively denies them the right to vote, in violation of the state and federal constitutions.
Under the rules of appellate procedure, the supreme court will first decide whether the petition "demonstrates a preliminary basis for relief." If it does, it will issue an "order to show cause," requiring Miami-Dade County to show cause why the relief requested by Saldana should not be granted. Although the First DCA is not technically a party to the case, it may respond to the petition as well if it so chooses. On the other hand, if the supreme court decides that the petition does not demonstrate a preliminary basis for relief, it will simply deny the petition without ever requiring a response from anyone.
What's the point of all this? I suppose that Mr. Saldana must believe that he'll get a more favorable result in his case if it's decided by another district court of appeal (in his case, the Third DCA). Would this really be true? I don't know. Saldano is a firefighter whose claim for the compensability of his heart disease was rejected by the JCC, who found that the presumption of compensability provided by s.112.18 had been overcome by evidence presented by the County. You can read the order on appeal here.
