First DCA: JCC Not Disqualified from Hearing Claimant's Case

As I discussed here briefly, if a litigant in a workers' compensation proceeding fears that he will not receive a fair hearing at the hands of the JCC assigned to his case, Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Q-6.126 provides that he may file a motion seeking disqualification of the judge under the applicable Florida Rules of Judicial Administration.  The standard for granting relief under this rule is not whether the litigant has a subjective fear that he will not receive a fair hearing.  Rather, he must allege in his motion specific facts which would prompt a reasonably prudent person to conclude that he could not get a fair hearing.

 

Once legally sufficient factual allegations are made, however, Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.330(f) provides that the JCC may not pass on the truth of the facts alleged.  If the facts alleged are legally sufficient, he must grant the motion.  If the movant believes that his motion has been improperly denied, he may seek immediate review of that decision by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in the First DCA without having to wait for an adverse order from the JCC on the merits of his case.

 

In Schwartzkopf v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., and Robinson v. Warden Construction, Inc., both decided on 5/8/2008, the First DCA by a 2-1 vote in each case summarily denied such petitions.  Both cases involved motions to disqualify JCC Terlizzese which were filed by the same attorney.  Because the court elected not to write a full opinion in either case, however, we know very little about the facts that were alleged in the petitioners' motions below.  (The motions also are not available on DOAH's website). 

 

However, from Chief Judge Browning's dissenting opinions, it appears that an adversarial relationship had developed not between the JCC and the claimant, but between the JCC and the claimant's attorney.  Without reciting them in detail, Judge Browning concluded that the facts alleged in the motions were legally sufficient and that they therefore should have been granted.  (There are, in fact, several decisions in non-workers' compensation cases holding that an adversarial relationship between a judge and a litigant's attorney can under certain circumstances form a sufficient basis for disqualification of the judge.  See, e.g., Franco v. State, 777 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). 

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JCC's 23-Month Delay in Entering Final Order Affirmed

"Justice delayed is justice denied," goes the old saying.  Consistent with that maxim, §440.25(4), Fla. Stat., provides that the JCC "shall" issue a final order within 30 days of a hearing on the merits of a claim.  But what if he doesn't?  What if instead of taking one month he takes, say, 23 months?  Previous decisions from the First DCA make it clear that the JCC's failure to issue a timely order is not reversible error per se; such "stale" orders will be reversed on appeal only if the losing party can demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the delay.  Prejudicial error has typically been found in cases where the resolution of one or more factual determinations necessary to the decision turned on the credibility of the witnesses who testified live before the JCC.  In such cases, the First DCA has concluded that the JCC could not possibly have remembered the details of the testimony, thus requiring reversal of the "stale" order and a remand for a hearing de novo.

 

But over the last several years, the First DCA has added yet another requirement to securing a reversal in such cases - before filing the notice of appeal, the aggrieved party must first file a motion for rehearing with the JCC in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.  Apparently, the claimant's failure to file such a motion resulted in the court's per curiam affirmance of the JCC's order in Suluki v. American Airlines, decided on 5/8/2008.  Chief Judge Browning concurred in the result but wrote separately to express his view that the JCC's 23-month delay in issuing her order would otherwise constitute reversible error per se

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